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ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY CONCLUDED THAT ALLSTATE HAD NO 
DUTY TO DEFEND. 
A. The Acts of the Thatchers Constitute an "Occurrence" Covered by the Policy 
As set forth in the Policy, Allstate promised the Thatchers that it would "pay damages 
which an insured person becomes legally obligated to pay because of bodily injury or property 
damage arising from an occurrence." (R. at 193). Thus, the determination of whether Allstate 
has a duty to defend depends partly upon the meaning of "occurrence," which the Policy defines 
as "an accident." (R. at 107). 
According to Utah state law, "[t]he word [accident] is descriptive of means which 
produce effects which are not their natural and probable.consequences." Green v. State Farm 
Fire & Casualty Co., 127 P.2d 1279, 1283 (quoting Nova Cas. Co. v. Able Constr. Inc., 983 P.2d 
575, 579 (1999) (quoting Richards v. Standard Accident Ins. Co. 58 Utah 622 (1921) (quoting 
Western Commercial Travelers' Assfn v. Smith, 85 F. 401, 405 (8th Cir. 1898). Indeed, even 
cases cited by Allstate suggest that an intentional act that causes injury may yet be considered 
accidental unless the injury is "the natural result" of the act, or the "natural and probable 
consequence" of the act.1 Millard Warehouse Inc. v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 283 N.W.2d 
1
 From a philosophical perspective, of course, Allstate's single-minded reliance upon this 
"natural and probable consequence" definition of accident is problematic, since it ultimately 
leads to the bizarre conclusion that no conceivable incident could ever be "accidental." An 
ignorant housekeeper, for example, thinking to clean more efficiently a heavily soiled tile floor, 
might add some ammonia (NH3) to their bleach (NaOCl), releasing lethal chlorine gas (C12). 
Under Allstate's definition—since chlorine has long been known to be the "natural and 
probable" outcome of the mixtures—the ignorant housekeeper's probable death must be 
considered suicide, since he or she intended to combine the two compounds. Allstate's refusal to 
include the highly relevant considerations of expectation and intention lead to such absurd results 
that the Court must reject its overbroad definition of accident out of hand. The Titanic—from 
Allstate's perspective—was sent to the bottom of the Atlantic in two pieces on purpose: it is 
quite natural for icebergs to drift into sea lanes, for trans-Atlantic luxury liners to use those sea 
lanes, and for the two of them (berg and liner), on the courses and at the speeds they were each 
pursuing, to bash into each other. The Titanic's resulting loss of buoyancy was the natural and 
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56, 62-63 (Neb. 1979). Concerning such consequences, the Utah Supreme Court has stated that, 
"[t]he natural consequence of means used [is] the consequence which ordinarily follows from 
their use—the result which may be reasonably anticipated from their use, and which ought to be 
expected. The probable consequence of the use of given means is the consequence which is more 
likely to follow from their use than it is to fail to follow." Nova, 983 P.2d at 579 (emphasis 
added; quoting Richards, 58 Utah at 1023) (quoting Smith, 85 F. at 405). 
It is this critical consideration of expectation and intent that separates Utah's reasonable 
test for accident from the naive and unrealistic formulaic definition Allstate wishes this Court to 
adopt. An injury caused by a deliberate or intentional act, realistically speaking, can be 
considered an accident if the injury could not be "reasonably anticipated or expected." Fire 
Insurance Exchange v. Rosenberg, 930 P. 2d 1202, 1205-06 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), overruled in 
part by Benjamin v. Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 UT 37, f 23 n. 3, 140 P. 3d 1210. Utah courts 
have clearly held that "[w]hether, in a particular case, an intentional act leading to unintended 
harm is considered accidental or not generally depends on the likelihood that the intentional act 
will result in harm of the type that in fact occurred." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 904 F. Supp. 
1270, 1279 (D.Utah 1995). 
Allstate tries to claim that the mere intentional nature of the Thatcher's building of the 
sports court disqualifies its alleged inadvertent misplacement from being an "accident" under the 
policy. Utah caselaw, however, does not "stand for the proposition that any injury caused by an 
intentional act cannot be an occurrence under [a] polic[y] at issue," Rosenberg, 930 P. 2d at 
1206; Utah courts—focusing as they do on expectation rather than mere consequence—realize 
predictable result of the application of the laws of hydrostatics. Therefore, because the captain 
was in fact fully aware of what he was doing when he chose the Titanic's course and speed, the 
deaths of the 1500 casualties were obviously a simple case of mass murder. Fortunately, Utah 
law as to the nature of accidents is not the shortsighted, simplistic, broadbrush natural-and-
probable formula Allstate suggests it to be. 
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rather, that "it does not follow that the result of an insured's intentional conduct can always be 
reasonably anticipated or expected." Id. Although the Thatchers intentionally built a sports 
court, any encroachment onto their neighbor's property was not "reasonably anticipated or 
expected." In short, trespass of the sort the Thatchers were accused of is neither the "natural 
result" nor the "probable consequence" of building a sports court. Under Utah law, "[t]he 
probable consequence [of an act] is the consequence which is more likely to follow . . . than it is 
to fail to follow." Smith, 85 F. at 405 (emphasis added). In this case, trespass upon a neighbor's 
property was not the more likely consequence of building the sports court at issue. 
Because Utah courts have not yet directly addressed this issue, it is helpful to note that 
Courts throughout the country consistently hold that trespass can be an "occurrence" under an 
insurance policy, especially if the trespass occurs due to a mistaken belief that the individuals 
had a legal right to be on the land. See Mutual ofEnumclaw Ins. Co. v. Gass, 786 P. 2d 749, 750-
51 (Or. Ct. App. 1990); Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. G.E. Leach Constr. Co., 272 Cal. 
Rptr. 704, 705-06 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990).2 Utah law is very clear: trespass may be committed 
accidentally or negligently as well as intentionally. See Pehrson v. Saderup, 28 Utah 2d 77, 498 
P.2d 648, 651 (Utah 1966) (u[T]he legislature did not intend that such a penalty should apply to 
cases in which the trespass was committed through an innocent mistake as to the boundary or 
location of a tract of land claimed by the defendant."). 
Utah courts consistently hold that "an effect which is not the natural or probable 
consequence of the [act] which produced it, an effect which does not ordinarily follow and 
cannot be reasonably anticipated from the [act], an effect which the actor did not intend to 
produce . . . is produced by accidental means." Smith, 85 F. at 405. Thus, because the trespass 
2
 Allstate does not cite a single contrary decision, but instead attempts to dilute this 
obvious trend by reminding the Court that it need not follow out-of-state decision. It is 
interesting to note that the Allstate brief relies heavily wponMillard Warehouse, a 1979 
Nebraska case, to support its own argument. 
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was not the natural and probable consequence of building the sports court, trespass does not 
usually follow from building sports courts, and the Thatchers did not intend to trespass, the 
injury was produced by an accident, and thus covered under the Policy. 
B. The Policy Does Not Expressly Exclude the Thatcher's Acts from Coverage 
Because the results of the Thatcher's intentional acts were unintentional and unexpected, 
the act does not fall under the exclusions listed in the Policy because even the Policy requires 
that the injury must be "intended" or "reasonably expected to result from the intentional... acts" 
in order to be excluded from coverage. (R. at 123). As explained above, however, any injury in 
this case was neither intended nor reasonably expected to occur. Allstate argues that it is clear 
under the policy that "intentional" acts are not covered, even if the result was different from what 
was expected or reasonably foreseen. They base this conclusion on the portion of the Policy that 
states that the Policy does not apply if the injury or damage is of a different kind or degree than 
intended or reasonably expected. (R. at 123). In this case, however, the alleged damage could 
not be "of a different kind than intended or reasonably expected" because no one intended or 
expected any damage of any. The language of the Policy in this case is consistent with case law 
throughout the state, requiring that damage of some kind must be reasonably expected to result 
from the intentional acts of the insured before the insurer may refuse coverage. 
Given plain Utah law, summary judgment in Allstate's favor was erroneously rendered 
below. However, even if any credence remains to Allstate's claims, such credence, at best creates 
an ambiguity of interpretation as to the nature of intent. Under Utah state law, "[a]s a matter of 
public policy, ambiguities or inconsistent provisions in insurance contracts are construed against 
the insurer and in favor of coverage." Li v. Zhang, 2005 UT App 246, flO, 120 P. 3d 30, cert, 
granted, Li v. Zhang, 124 P.3d 634 (Utah 2005) (quoting New W. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. 
Guardian Title Co, 818 P.2d 585, 589 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting Moore v. Energy Mut. Ins. 
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Co. 814 P.2d 1141, 1143 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). The Utah Supreme Court has held that 
"insurance policies should be construed liberally in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so 
as to promote and not defeat the purposes of insurance." Benjamin v< Arnica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006 
UT 37, % 24, 140 P. 3d 1210. The Thatchers' act of building a sports court simply does not fall 
under the exclusions listed in the Policy, and in any argument concerning the Policy, the 
language "should be construed against the insurer and in favor of coverage," thus against Allstate 
in favor of the Thatchers. 
C. Allstate Owes a Duty to Defend Even if the Complaint Did Not Allege Negligence 
Under Utah law, an insurer has a broad duty to defend that can only be overcome if the 
insurer correctly concludes that there are no circumstances under which an insured could be 
found liable. In fact, an insurer has a duty to defend as long as "there are disputed facts which if 
proved by the plaintiff at trial would result in liability under the policy." Deseret Fed. Sav. & 
Loan Assfn v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 714 P.2d 1143, 1147 (Utah 1986). This rule 
applies even if a court were to find an insured liable for a claim not alleged. In such cases, where 
the "duty to defend is dependent on whether there is actually a 'covered claim or suit,'" an 
insurance company must look to both the "allegations in the complaint" and any "extrinsic 
evidence" such as the underlying factual allegations not specifically identified in the complaint. 
Fire Ins. Esch. v. Estate of Therkelsen, 2001 UT 48, ffll 13, 23-25, 27 P. 3d 555. Thus, if either 
the specific allegations of the complaint, or the facts underlying those allegations, if true, could 
in any way, give rise to a potential for liability, an insurer has a duty to defend. 
In the case of trespass, even if the allegations of the complaint allege an intentional 
trespass, because an "owner is still entitled to recover actual damages on proof of the 
unintentional trespass," an insurer is "obligated to defend" the claims. Parker v. Hartford Fire 
4R47-1884-5185 r 
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Ins. Co., 278 S.E.2d 803, 804 (Va. 1981). Thus, "[i]f a complaint alleges a willful trespass but 
could also support liability for a nonwillful trespass, then the insurer has the duty to defend." 
Gass, 786 P.2d at 750. Although the underlying lawsuit in this case claims intentional trespass, 
both the facts in the claim and those set forth in subsequent affidavits could, if proven, support a 
recovery for negligent trespass, and, even when intentional torts are alleged in a complaint, 
where "the underlying factual allegations [are] sufficient to satisfy the elements of [an 
unintentional claim], the insurer is obligated to [defend claims of unintentional injury] until those 
claims are either dismissed or otherwise resolved in a manner inconsistent with coverage." 
Benjamin, 2006 UT 37 at ffl[ 20, 24. 
CONCLUSION 
For the above reasons, the Thatcher's respectfully requests that this Court reverse the 
grant of summary judgment by the district court in Allstate's favor and Order that Summary 
Judgment be granted in Thatchers favor requiring Allstate to cover and defend its insureds agents 
the Trespass Claim. 
DATED this Z& day of February, 2007. 
SMITH HARTVIGSEN, PLLC 
Attorneys for Defendants Thomas F. Thatcher and Kathlyn J. Thatcher 
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